EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by the Faculty and
Students of the Yale School of Law
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.60 A YEAR SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS
EDITORIAL BOARD
KARL N. LLEwELLYN, Editor-in-Chief WILLIAm A. KELLY, 2D,
STEPHEN F. DUNN, Business Manager
Case and Comment Editor CoRNEuus B. ComEYS, Secretary
BaiaAm M. BAILEY CARLs ICAZA
MORRIS BLUMER RALPH H. KING
JOHN M. COMLEY I. ARTHUR M A
WUIAm MURRAY FIEU) ROBERT PFLIEGER, In War Service
CHARLES A. HARRISON HAY SILvERSToNE
Canadian subscription price is $3.oo a year; foreign, $3.25 a year.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his sub-
scription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuation
of the subscription is desired.
CLAIMS PROVABLE IN RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS.
Although the power of the English Court of Chancery to appoint
receivers is "one of the oldest remedies" of that Court' and although
some of the most important questions arising in the whole field of com-
mercial law concern the liquidation of insolvent corporations by
receivers, many portions of the law of receivers remain curiously unset-
tled. This is particularly so as to the question of claims provable
against the assets in the hands of a receiver. Thus in Connecticut the
Aetna Indemnity Company has been in process of liquidation by
receivers since early in 1911, but it is only now that the law has been
partially settled by two recent decisions in these proceedings: Bashford-
Burmister Company v. Aetna Indemnity Company (1919, Conn.) 105
At. 470; Husbands v. Aetna Indemnity Company (1919, Conn.) 105
Atl. 480.2
'Giffard, V. C. in Hopkins v. Worcester, etc. Canal Co. (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 437,
447; I Clark Receivers (1918) sec. 4.
" For complete statement of facts, see RECENT CASE NoTEs, infra. In addition
to the points herein discussed, other interesting questions arose. Thus the
claimants were held to have been excused from presenting their claims within
the time limited by the court by reason of the fact that the receivers, by court




These cases deal with two very important questions: (i) within what
time must claims mature in order to be provable in the receivership
proceedings and share in the dividend from the assets held by the
receiver? and (2) what constitutes a matured claim as distinguished
from a contingent claim?
The rules recently announced in New York have influenced the course
of decisions in Connecticut. In the first of a series of cases the New
York Court of Appeals held that claims, to share in the dividend, must
have matured at the time of the commencement of the action in which
the receiver is appointed; and that a claim against a surety on a
bond given in substitution of an attachment in a suit where judgment
was not obtained until after the receiver's appointment, was contingent
and could not share in the dividend.3 Next it held, though with a vig-
orous dissenting opinion, that claims under the United States Statute,
of unpaid materialmen against the surety on the bond of the contractor
for government works and improvements, were contingent, judgment
not having been secured prior to the receivership in the federal court
specified in the statute.4
Subsequent to these decisions the lower courts in Connecticut adopted
the New York rule for the Aetna Receivership, and this rule was
applied against many claims in this receivership, until it has now been
at least partially set aside by the principal cases above referred to. The
New York court has meanwhile modified its position very materially
in holding that materialmen under this same federal statute might share
in the dividend where they had instituted suit in the federal court prior
to the receivership, although such suit had not gone to judgment.5
"People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (Matter of Fleet v. Yawger) (1912) 205
N. Y. 135, 98 N. E. 412, Ann. Cas. I9I3D urSo. The decision that the claim was
contingent until judgment was obtaindd in the suit in which the bond was sub-
stituted for the attachment is obviously correct. Judgment was necessary to
settle the question whether there would be any claim.
"People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (Matter of Smith Co. v. Yawger) (1914)
211 N. Y. io7, 1o5 N. E. 99, three judges dissenting. The Act of Congress of
August 13, 1894, ch. 28o, amended by Act of February 24, i9o5, ch. 778, 33 Stat.
L. 811 ( U. S. Comp. St. I916, sec. 6923), provides that a contractor on govern-
ment works shall give the usual surety bond with the additional obligation that
he shall promptly pay all persons supplying labor or materials in the prosecution
of the work. The Act then provides for suit on this bond by such materialmen,
stating that the suit shall be brought in the federal court for the district in which
the contract was to be performed "and not elsewhere." The government may
bring suit within six months from the date of completion of the contract, during
which period no suit may be instituted by materialmen, though they may inter-
vene in any suit brought by the government. Only one action is to be brought,
all other claimants intervening in that action.
"Matter of Empire State Suiety Co. (915) 216 N. Y. 273, i1O N. E. 61o.
Two of the three judges who dissented here were with the majority of the
court in the case referred to in note 4, supra, but the complexion of the court
had changed in the meantime. The court attempts to distinguish the previous
decision on the ground that here claimants had instituted suit in the federal
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The principal cases, which are decisions in favor of claimants, do
not definitely settle the first question, namely within what time claims
must mature in order to share in the dividend. They seem to tend
toward the New York rule applied in the trial court and urged by the
receiver, inasmuch as they state the rule that claims must have matured
prior to the institution of receivership proceedings, but hold that the
claims in question had so matured.6 At most, the cases are only dicta
on this point and in the absence of any discussion it may still be con-
sidered open in Connecticut. The point deserves careful consideration.
While the New York Courts state the rule generally, it may there be
rested on the New York Statute.7 The bankruptcy rule is the same,
but there likewise it follows from the wording of the Bankruptcy Act.8
It has, however, been applied generally in many cases.9 For a time it
appeared to be the usual rule, but seems now to be losing in favor, due
in large measure to the forceful opinion of Judge Noyes for the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the New York City
Railway Receivership."0 Only recently the Supreme Court of the
court before the receivership, whereas in the previous decision no suit had been,
or could have been, instituted, six months not having elapsed since the completion
of the work. It is submitted that there is no real ground of distinction between
the cases. Either the form of remedy under the Statute is so far part of the
right created that the claim is contingent until judgment is obtained, or right
and remedy are distinct and the claim matures when the default or breach of
bond occurs. On the New York rule see also Matter of Empire State Surety
Company (1915) 2r4 N. Y. 553, io8 N. E. 825.
'So also in Bridgeport v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (1916) 9I Conn. i97, 99 AtI.
566. Cf. however, Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co. (1903) 76 Conn. :7, 40, 55
At. 599.
'Art. VI of General Corporation Law of N. Y. An order is passed sequestra-
ting the property of the corporation and dissolving the corporation. The dis-
tribution takes place first among the creditors whose claims represent a fixed
liability at the time of the commencement of the action and the order of seques-
tration. People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (i916, N. Y.) 171 App. Div. i5,
i56 N. Y. Supp. 1027, 1139.
"Sec. 63 of the Bankruptcy Act; Re Pettingill (i9o5, D. Mass.) i37 Fed.
z43, 146; Re Neff (I9o7, C. C. A. 6th) 157 Fed. 57, 84 C. C. A. 561, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 349; and cases cited notes io and ii infra.
'Attorney General v. Equitable Accident Ass'n (.goo) 175 Mass. 196, 55 N. E.
890 (applying statute); Lenoir v. Linville Imp. Co. (1900) 126 N. C. 922, 36
S. E. i85, 5i L. R. A. 146; Appeal of Dean (I889) 98 Pa. ioi; People v. Com-
mercial Alliance Life Ins. Co. (1896) 15o N. Y. 94, 45 N. E. 8; cases collected
in 23 R. C. L. io2 and in Ann. Cas. 1913D 1184.
"Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. (i912, C. C. A. 2d) 198 Fed.
721, 736. See page 741 of i98 Fed.: "It is not a light thing for a Chancery
Court acting without statutory direction to say that a creditor shall lose his
demand when he has not been at fault and when the settlement of the estate will
not be protracted by allowing it." The court points out that this is not incon-
sistent with the rule of cases like Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co. (1914)
88 Conn. x85, 2o6, 90 At. 369, that no interest is allowed upon claims after the
appointment of a receiver.
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United States, speaking through Mr. justice Holmes, has approved
Judge Noyes' opinion and held that receivers, in the absence of statu-
tory law, have no authority to give to the filing of the bill the effect of
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy so as to exclude a claim maturing
within a reasonable time befor6 distribution can be made.1 ' Here
claims which matured within the period allowed by the court for the
filing of claims were permitted to share in the dividend. Other cases
have suggested other and later periods within which claims should
mature to share in the dividend, notably within the period to the order
declaring the dividend, or within a period limited by special order of
court.
12
Advocates of the stricter rule say that theoretically the division of
the assets is made as of the date of the institution of proceedings. But
this is not an argument, and actually division is never made then and is
usually not made for some years thereafter. The entire question is one
of policy, not of logic; the real argument for the stricter rule is that
it is one of convenience, that a point of rest must be reached at some
time in order that the affairs of the insolvent corporation may be
wound up and its assets distributed, or else such proceedings can never
terminate, and that in order to hasten this time the period should be
set as far in advance as possible. In any event, so it is contended,
some deserving creditors must suffer for the benefit of the many, and
this early date is as fair as any which can be selected and is the most
desirable date from the administrative standpoint. But the difficulty
is that the date of institution of proceedings is not in the control of the
court, and, if not fixed by chance, may be fixed by the acts or con-
nivance of interested parties, either creditors or the debtor,-the parties
litigant-who thus juggle with the contractual relations of those claim-
ants whose contracts are still executory. Contractual relations should
not be fixed in such a haphazard manner."3 If they must be interfered
with at all by a court of equity, they should be fixed directly by the
court by its own order and in such manner as will make for as little
interference as is consistent with due expedition in liquidating the
property under the court's control. It is even doubtful if there would
be very great delay in settlement if the time when the dividend is
declared is to be taken as the point of rest, but certainly there will be
Wrin. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed (1918) 245 U. S. 597, 602, 38 Sup. Ct. 211.
See this case below in (i9,5, C. C. A. ist) :3o Fed. 31, 33. In accord see
In Re Ross & Son, Inc. (1915) io Del. Ch. 434, 95 Atl. 311.
2New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lombard Inv. Co. (1896, C. C. W.
D. Mo.) 73 Fed. 537; Hayes v. Scudder (1888) 32 Mo. App. 372.
" It may be said that as judgment may still be obtained against the debtor,
contractual relations are not interfered with. But the judgment is of no value
if the receiver holds all the debtor's assets. It may be that the primary relations
resulting from the contract are not interfered with. But the secondary rela-
tions which concern the enforcement of any judgment dealing with these
primary relations are interfered with.
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none if the point chosen is that of the time within which claims must
be filed. As the court will, for good cause shown, extend the time for
presenting claims so as to prevent all injustice,'4 it seems eminently
fair to take this as the point of rest. The stricter rule does shut out,
without statutory authority, many claims which, in all fairness, should
share in the dividend, without thereby hastening settlement of the
estate. The only gain under this rule is an increase in dividend to cer-
tain claimants at the expense of others fully as deserving. This is a
result which ought not to appeal to a court of equity.
The Connecticut court has, however, adopted an eminently fair rule
as to what are matured claims. In the first case under discussion the
court held that unpaid materialmen might, under the United States
Statute above referred to,15 share in the dividend to be paid by the
receivers of the surety on the contractor's bond, although judgment
was not obtained in the federal court until after the receiver's appoint-
ment in the state court. In the second case, where a principal in an
indemnity bond was in default prior to the receivership of the surety,
but the amount was not ascertained until judgment was thereafter
entered in a foreign jurisdiction, it was held that the claim was not
contingent, the court pointing out the well settled distinction between
claims which are really contingent and claims which have matured, but
where the amount of damages is unliquidated.
It is suggested that in reaching its decision in the first case the court
made more difficulty out of the situatidn than was necessary. The
court refers to the usual rule that a court controlling receivership pro-
ceedings may decide whether it shall determine for itself all claims of
or against a receiver, or will allow them to be litigated elsewhere, 8
but then states that this rule must give away in this case to the express
provisions of the Act of Congress creating the right and the remedy
and definitely naming the court, i. e. the federal court, in which the
remedy must be pursued. It therefore holds that the trial court was
" In Buzzell v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (1917) 91 Conn. 359, IOO Atl. 32, the
court held the matter of extension of time to be a question of discretion. For
liberal practice in extending the time for presenting claims to a receiver, see
London & S. & F. Bank v. Willamette Steam Mill L. & M. Co. (1897,
C. C. S. D. Cal.) 8o Fed. 226; Grinnell v. Merchants Insurance Co. (1863, Ch.)
16 N. J. Eq. 283; Pattberg v. Pattberg & Brothers (1897, Ch.) 55 N. J. Eq. 6o4,
38 Atl. 2o5; Wall v. Young (1895, Ch.) 54 N. J. Eq. 24, 33 Atl. 526; Richter v.
Merchants Natt. Bank (1896) 65 Minn. 237, 67 N. W. 995; Taylor v. Moore
(1897) 64 Ark. 23, 40 S. W. 258; Bank of Washington v. Creditors (1877) 8o
N. C. 9; McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Woltman (1894) 114 N. C. 178, i
S. E. iog; Eddy, Petitioner (1887) I5 R. I. 474, 8 Atl. 694.
" See note 4, supra.
"Porter v. Sabin (1893) 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1OO8, 37 L. ed. i51,
157, 815; Attorney General v. American Legion of Honor (19o7) 196 Mass. 151,
157, 81 N. E. 966; Odell v. Batterman Co. (1915, C. C. A. 2d) 223 Fed. 298,
io8 C. C. A. 54o.
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powerless to determine the validity and amount of the liabilities of the
surety under this bond, and that the Congressional Act displaces pro
tanto the jurisdiction of the court appointing the receiver, though the
judgment itself does not affect the assets in the hands of the receiver
until it is presented to the court of the receivership and the judgment
creditor has intervened in the receivership action.
Obviously the receiver's assets are not affected by the judgment until
it is proved in the receivership proceedings. 1 Is such proof only a
matter of form, and must the court of the receivership accept the judg-
ment of the federal court? The decision seems so to hold. If the
remedy under the Statute is so far a part of the right created by the
Statute as this, it would seem they are altogether inseparable, so that
until the" remedy is followed, there is no right; or in other words, any
claim under the statute remains contingent until judgment is obtained.1 8
Under the equitable rule allowing claims to mature after the institu-
tion of the receivership proceedings, such claim would still not neces-
sarily be barred from sharing in the dividend. But is not the Connect-
icut court, under its own construction of the Federal Act, in reality here
allowing a claim which was contingent at the date of the receivership?
But it is submitted that the true construction of the Federal Act is
that the requirement as to the place of suit is merely a restriction on
the remedy,-on the adjective relations, as distinguished from the sub-
stantive relations, arising under the Statute-which a court of equity
in settling the affairs of an insolvent corporation need not require.19
A court of equity which has taken possession of the affairs of a cor-
poration for purposes of liquidation should, for reasons of adminis-
trative convenience at least, have the power, as it admittedly has in
all ordinary cases, to decide the manner and place where claims shall
be adjusted. Why should it not have that power in this case? Is it
so hampered that it cannot recognize statutory causes of action, only
judgments?" It is submitted that the court of the receivership not
only may, but should, recognize statutory causes of action, though in
this extraordinary proceeding it should not be hampered by the restric-
'
T U. S. v. Illinois Surety Co. (1917, E. D. N. C.) 238 Fed. 840, 846.
This was the theory of the court in People v. Metropolitan Surety Co.
(1914) 211 N. Y. io7, 1o5 N. E. 99; supra, note 4.
"'This was the theory of the dissenting judges in People v. Metropolitan Surety
Co., supra, note 4: "There is a vital distinction between a condition of liability
and a conditioxr of the enforcement of that liability."
o Compare the decisions of which Flash v. Cogtnecticut (1883) iog U. S. 371,
3 Sup. Ct 263, is an example, that where the statutory liability of one is sub-
ject to the condition precedent of an unsatisfied judgment against another, per-
formance of this condition is rendered unnecessary by the other's bankruptcy.
In Blair v. St. Louis H. & K. R. (1884, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 19 Fed. 861 the court
of the receivership permitted persons claiming statutory liens to file them with
the receiver with the same force and effect as if filed respectively in the state
courts.
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tions placed upon the enforcement of such causes by means of suit in
ordinary litigation. In making its equitable distribution it should
recognize substantive relations, whether arising under statute or other-
wise, while the manner in which it is proceeding would make it unnec-
essary that it follow restrictions on adjective relations.
This discussion leads directly to the question whether claims
founded on executory contracts of the insolvent, 21 unfulfilled by the
receiver, are provable. Clearly a receiver acting for the benefit of all
creditors may find an executory contract so burdensome that he should
not carry it out. May he refuse to complete it so that the obligee is
without redress against the insolvent's property? Many cases so
hold.22  In a leading case23 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
has urged that the "privilege" 24 of the receiver to refuse to carry out
a burdensome contract would be a barren privilege if the claimant
could then prove his claim for the breach. Yet his power of refusal
may even then not be entirely barren; and as a matter of equity and
fair dealing why should he have a privilege of refusal which will
deprive the obligee of his contract merely to enrich other creditors?
Moreover, by what law does a court of equity obtain authority thus in
reality, if not in form, to impair the obligation of contracts ?25 It is
submitted that as a matter of justice, as well as law, the individual
should not be sacrificed to add a few dollars to the dividend of the
many.28
2 The word "insolvent!' is used advisedly, since no dispute as to liability arises
if the estate ultimately proves solvent or more than sufficient to pay other
creditors. See Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., note 6, supra; cf. note 13, supra.
'People v. Globe Mut. Life Insurance Co. (1883) 9i N. Y. 174; Lenoir v.
Linville Imp. Co. (x9oo) 126 N. C. 922, 36 S. E. 185; Law v. Waldron (I9x)
23o Pa. 458, 79 Atl. 647; Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., supra; 34 Cyc. 258,
264. If the receiver does adopt the contract he must take the burdens with the
benefits. Butterworth v. Degnan Construction Co. (1913, S. D. N. Y.) 2o8 Fed.
381; Eames v. Claflin Co. (915, S. D. N. Y.), 22o Fed. i9o; Atchison T. & S.
R..R. v. Hurley (19o7, C. C. A. 8th) 153 Fed. 503; Eaton v. Houston & T. C.
R. R. (i889, C. C. E. D. Tex.) 38 Fed. 784; Spencer v. World's Col. Exposition
(i896) 163 Ill. 117, 45 N. E. 25o; Worthington v. Park Improvement Co. (1896)
ioo Ia. 39, 69 N. W. 258; Commercial Publishing Co. v. Beckwith (igoi) 167
N. Y. 329, 332, 6o N. E. 642; Kuebler v. Haines (igio) 229 Pa. 274, 78 At. 141.
Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., supra.
24"Privilege" is hardly the correct term, inasmuch as the very question for
decision by the court was whether the receiver had a privilege. The expression
should have been "power" here. The court does ultimately hold that there
is a privilege. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE
LAW JouRNAL, i; (1917) 26 ibid. 710; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, etc. (1917)
26 ibid. 186 ff.
Cf. note 13, supra.
So held in Spader v. Mural Dec. Mfg. Co. (189o) 47 N. J. Eq. 18, 20 At.
378; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. IV. Y. City Ry. (1912 C. C. A. 2d) I98 Fed. 721,
740; Rosenbaum v. Credit System Co. (1898) 6x N. J. L. 543, 40 At. 59i;
McLean Sons Co. v. Butler & Co. (1914, D. C. Mass.) 208 Fed. 730; Howe v.
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It is held under the Bankruptcy Act that the appointment of a
receiver over a corporation by a state court constitutes a breach of the
corporation's executory contracts, so that the obligees under such
contracts may prove their claims against the corporation if it later
goes into bankruptcy.2 7 This seems entirely proper and would lead
to this: that where the receiver may repudiate executory contracts of
the insolvent corporation over which he is receiver, these obligees
should thereafter, where permitted by the Bankruptcy Act, take meas-
ures to force the corporation into bankruptcy and thus share in the
corporation's assets. In other words, this rule would naturally and
properly have the effect of ousting the state court of jurisdiction.
It would seem that the true end to be sought in the settlement of an
estate by receivers is the distribution of the assets, so far as consistent
with a reasonably prompt settlement, aniong all those who have actual
claims against the insolvent, and that it is not to shut out as many of
such creditors as possible in order that the remaining creditors should
receive an increased dividend. 2  Hence the principal cases are com-
mendable as tending towards such equitable distribution.
EFFECT OF WAR ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
A recent decision of the House of Lords, Rodriguez v. Speyer
Brothers (1918) 119 L. T. Rep. 4o9, raises a new aspect of the rule
denying non-resident alien enemies the privilege of suing in municipal
courts during the war. In that case, a partnership of six persons, of
whom five were British and one a German residing in Germany-the
partnership on the outbreak of the war being thereby dissolved-
brought an action in the liquidation proceedings to recover a pre-war
debt due the firm. All the partners being joined as co-plaintiffs, the
Hardy (890) 76 Tex. 17, 13 S. W. 41, 18 Am. St. Rep. 17. Thus in Spader v.
Mural Dec. Mfg. Co., supra, it is said by the court: "Natural justice demands
that those who suffered from breaches of contract should be included in the
distribution, even though the breaches and consequent damages follow the
insolvency." Cf. also Tiffen Glass Co. v. Stoehr (1896) 54 Oh. St. 157, 43 N. E.
-79: Yelland's Case (1867, Wood, V. C.) L. R. 4 Eq. 350; Ex parte Clark
(1869, James, V. C.) L. R. 7 Eq. 550; Ex parte Logan (187o, Romilly, M. R.)
L. R. 9 Eq. 149; In re Dale & Plant, Ltd. (188% Kay, J.) L. R. 43 Ch. D. 255;
it re Newdigate Col. Ltd. [191ml i Ch. 468. Some of the cases attempt to dis-
tinguish between voluntary and involuntary receiverships, basing the distinction
on the point whether or not the corporation admitted insolvency and joined in
the prayer for the appointment of a receiver It is then suggested that such
claims are provable when the receivership is voluntary and not when it is
involuntary. There seems to be no sound reason for this distinction. In re Ross
& Son, Inc. (915, Del. Ch.) 95 At. 311, 314.
'In re Mullings Clothing Co. (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 238 Fed. 58.
See People ex rel Attorney General v. Security Life Ins. Co. (1879) 79
N. Y. 267, 271, that the receiver is not to advocate the cause of one claimant
against another.
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defendant filed a plea in abatement, asserting the disability of the Ger-
man partner to appear as a plaintiff in an English court. The House
of Lords, by a majority of three to two, held that the ordinary disability
of the alien enemy plaintiff was not an inflexible rule to be applied irre-
spective of the public policy which supported it, and that it did not
apply to the case of a partner joined as co-plaintiff merely to get in
partnership assets in liquidation, from the proceeds of which the enemy
partner could not be enriched during the war.
It is an established rule of Anglo-American law that partnerships
between persons who by war become alien enemies are terminated by
the war.1 This rule is based on a. variety of reasons, all leading to the
same conclusion: (i) that the prohibition of all intercourse between
alien enemies renders impossible that intimate association and mutual
control which is essential to the partnership relation ;2 (2) that war
being of uncertain duration, it is impossible for the partners to take up
the threads of the business at the point where they were abandoned ;3
and (3) that a continuation of the partnership is incompatible with that
hostile position which the war imposes, for the private and public
duties of the partners would come into direct opposition.4
So much being clear, the question next arises as to how the interests
of the partners shall be determined and distributed and as to the effect
of the war upon those processes. In the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, the ordinary rule is that on a dissolution of a partnership
all the property of the partnership is to be converted by sale into money
and the proceeds, after discharge of the debts, divided among the
partners according to their respective shares.' The proceedings are
usually conducted under the supervision of a court of equity, which
may temporarily direct a continuation of the business. Although at
common law the share of the enemy partner vested in the Crown, the
modem rule prohibits its confiscation; and provided there is no imme-
diate liquidation, he is entitled to that part of the profits which are
earned during the war by his share of the assets.6 Being unable to
contribute personal service, his proportion of the profits may be less
than that of the active partners having equal shares with him. He
'Griswold v. Waddington (18ig, N. Y.) 16 Johns. 438; Hugh Stevenson &
Sons v. Aktiengesellschaft fiir Cartonnagen-industrie (H. L.) [I918] A. C. 239.
But in Matthews v. McStea (1875) 91 U. S. 7, it was held, by way of exception
to the general rule, that where commercial intercourse was not prohibited until
some time after the outbreak of the Civil War, a partnership was not dissolved
until intercourse was prohibited.
'The best discussion of the reason for the rule is to be found in Chancellor
Kent's opinion in Griswold v. Waddington, supra.
'Hall, Int. Law (7th ed.) 404.
'Griswold v, Waddington, ubi supra, at 489.
'English Partnership Act, 18go, sec. 42. Hugh Stevenson v. Aktiensgesell-
schaft, supra.
'Hugh Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft, supra.
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cannot, of course, receive his property during the war, nor can he sue
to recover it. The British and the United States Trading with the
Enemy Acts have provided for the vesting of his interest in the hands
of the Alien Property Custodian.
The disability of the alien enemy to sue7 has attached to actions by
partners, of whom the majority were alien enemies.8 Whether this
rule is of universal application to all actions by partners, however
slight the enemy interest, was the question before the House of Lords
in Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers. The minority, Lords Atidnson and
Sumner, regarded the alien enemy's disability as personal and as
admitting of no qualification arising either out of the size of the
enemy's partnership interest or out of the transaction in connection
with which the suit arose. The majority, Lords Finlay, Haldane and
Parmoor, tested the question by examining the rigidity of the rule of
disability. They found that exceptions to it were admitted in the case
of suits by executors and trustees ;9 that the purpose of the action in
the instant case was to collect the partnership assets, which could not,
during the war, benefit the alien enemy partner; that if the action
were suspended until the termination of the war the five British
partners would be the principal sufferers; that the enemy partner, had
he refused the use of his name as -co-plaintiff, might have been joined
as co-defendant ;19 that, as it was unnecessary to communicate with
him, it was permissible to join his name as co-plaintiff for the purpose
of getting in the partnership assets. It was therefore, held that the
rule of disability was not so firmly crystallized that it had become dis-
sociated from the public policy which gave it birth, and that it did not
require legislation to qualify it where its application in a particular case
would be opposed to public policy or when it does not involve the
mischief against which the rule was designed to guard.
It is doubtless true that the disability of the alien enemy to sue and
the prohibition of trading with the enemy had a different historical
origin. The former is much the older rule, having come into the law
as early as the fifteenth century; 1 the latter is mentioned judicially
toward the end of the eighteenth century only.1 2 The disability to
sue has been relaxed in favor of aliens who were permitted to remain
" See (1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 104.
8McConnell v. Hector (18o2, C. P.) 3 B. & P. 113; Candilis v. Victor
(1915, C. A.) 33 Times L. R. 20. See also Actien-Gesellschaft filr Amilin-
Fabrikation and Mersey Chemical Works v. Levinstein, Ltd. (1915, C. A.) 112
L. T. Rep. 963.
'Williams, Executors (ioth ed.) I6i; Kensington v. Inglis (i8o7, K. B.) 8
East, 273.
" Cullen v. Knowles [1898] 2 Q. B. 38o.
'See Coke in Calvin's case (16o9) 7 Rep. 17a.
'The Hoop (1799, Eng. Adm.) i C. Rob.. i96.
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under the protection of the laws ;'8 the prohibition to trade, which is
really a prohibition of all intercourse,1" may be relaxed by license, as
was done by the British in the Crimean War and by the United States
in the Spanish-American war, when trade with the enemy in neutral
vessels and non-contraband cargo was permitted. Doubtless, an enemy
licensed to trade could sue.1 5 In the modem development, therefore,
the inhibition as well as the permission to sue and to trade appear to
coincide, whatever the difference in origin of the public policy may
have been. Whether a citizen of enemy nationality domiciled in a
neutral country, with whom trade was prohibited by the blacldist regu-
lation, could sue in a municipal court on a cause of action unconnected
with enemy trade, is a question not yet judicially answered.
Whatever the public policy which denied the aid of the King's courts
to alien enemies, it does not appear to have resulted in such an absolute
disability that the courts took judicial notice of the alien enemy
character of the plaintiff.16 Not only did the plaintiff's disability have
to be pleaded, but it had to be pleaded correctly; so that if the cause of
action accrued before the war the remedy was only suspended during
the war and a plea in abatement, not a plea in bar, layY Again, where
the plaintiff was not an alien enemy, although the proceeds of a judg-
ment might ultimately inure to his benefit, the courts have found no
difficulty in allowing the action to proceed.18 The personal disability is
properly invocable in such cases only where the enrichment of the
enemy by the transfer of value to his country is possible during the
war-an offense against the criminal law-or where his institution of
the action requires communication with the enemy country, e. g. by
giving a power of attorney. So, the enemy's agent appointed before
the war may make a sale for his principal0 or may receive payment on
his behalf of a debt or of interest thereon. 20 Similarly, a petition to
" Wells v. Williams (I6W8) L Ld. Raym. 282; Clarke v. Morey (1813, N. Y.)
io Johns. 69. See (19,7) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 1O4.
" The Panariellos (1915, Eng. Adm.) 112 L T. Rep. 777.
"See Kensington v'. Inglis, supra.
" Flindt v. Waters (1812, K B.) 15 East, 26o.
"Ex parte Boussmaker (i8o6, Ch.) 13 Vesey, Jr. 7,; Burnside v. Matthews
(873) 54 N. Y. 78; Heiler v. Goodman (i918, N. J.) io5 Atl. 233; Bullen and
Leake, Precedents of Pleading (7th ed.) 496; 2 Chitty, Pleading (i6th Am. ed.)
297. But see LeBret v. Papillon (I8O4, K. B.) 4 East, 5o2.
"Mercedes Daimler Motor Co., Ltd. et al. v. Maudsley Motor Co., Ltd.
(i915, K. B.) 31 Times L. R. 178,--where by contract power to sue for infringe-
ment of patent was vested in English company, partner of a German company,
whose name, however, appeared as co-plaintiff. Rombac Baden Clock Co. v.
Gent (igi9, K. B.) 31 Times L. R. 492, where plaintiff was the English receiver
of a partnership having one German partner.
"Tingley v. Miiller (C. A.) [2917] 2 Ch. 144.
"Conn v. Penn (I818, U. S. C. C.) I Peter's C. C. 496.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
prove a debt in bankruptcy has been admitted, payment of the enemy
creditor's share being reserved until the close of the war.21
These cases sufficiently show that the disability, while personal, is
closely identified with the economic advantage that might flow to his
country by allowing a recovery during the war. If this is sufficiently
guarded against, and if no communication with the enemy country is
necessary, suit on the enemy's behalf may be allowed, especially if the
disqualification would react to the injury of nationals.
So firmly ingrained in our law is the fiction that a corporation is an
entity distinct from its stockholders, that no question appears to have
been raised as to the status of the enemy stockholders. Notwithstand-
ing the overwhelming proportion of enemy stock ownership in a
domestically incorporated company, the corporation can not become
an enemy corporation nor, unless the Alien Property Custodian deems
it essential in the public interest, is it wound up under recent Trading
with the Enemy Acts. Indeed, Lord Halsbury was the only member
of the House of Lords in the Daimler case 2 who considered that the
corporation was, like a partnership, a device to enable individuals to
employ and enjoy their property.2 But inasmuch as enemy stock
ownership does not necessitate communication between the directors
and the enemy stockholders, it appears to have been agreed, until the
present war evolved the practice of selling or sequestrating their
interest, that such stock shall continue the property of its owners, any
voting thereon 4 and the payment of dividends 25 being inhibited and
suspended during the continuation of the war. The alternative to
preservation has heretofore been confiscation. This is expressly pre-
vented by various treaties and Westlake seems to think it "is now out
of the question." 26  The test of enemy character in this war seems to
have been majority control by enemy directors, 27 and for the same rea-
son that enemy partners drop out, thereby terminating the partnership,
enemy directors must cease their functions,2s although this does not
Ex parte Boussmaker, supra.
2 Daimler v. Continental Tyre Co. (H. L.) [i916] A. C. 3o7.
(1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 108.
"Robson v. Premier Oil and Pipe Co. Ltd. (1915, C. A.) 113 L. T. Rep. 523.
Even the giving of a proxy is prohibited, inasmuch as this requires communica-
tion with the enemy. Rex v. London County Council -I9151 2 K. B. 466.
Lindley, Companies (6th ed.) 52.
' Robert A. Chadwick, Foreign Investnents in Time of War (1904) 20 L. QUART.
REv. 167, 178. The French Alien Property Custodian is deemed competent to
receipt for dividends payable by a British company to a German stockholder
resident in France. Lepage v. San Paulo Copper Estates (1917, Ch.) 33 Times
L. R. 457.
2 Westlake, Int. Law (igo7) 49.
'Daimler v. Continental Tyre Co., supra, See also (i917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 108.
282 Westlake, op. cit. 50.
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necessarily terminate the corporation. But it is unquestionable that the
enemy shares can continue to earn profits during the war and that their
owners can after the war claim the benefits. 29 *
The present war has developed a compromise between preservation
and confiscation of the enemy's interest in associations. At common
law, when it was still proper to confiscate the enemy's private property,
the enemy partner's share vested in the Crown. Now the Alien
Property Custodian is usually appointed to assist in the winding up of
partnerships and to sequestrate the enemy's share. With respect to
corporations, the Alien Property Custodian is empowered either to
receive the dividends of enemy owned stock, or to sell it to nationals or
to vote it and with it obtain representation on the Board of Directors.
He is been further empowered to wind up any business which, by reason
of enemy control, was carried on wholly or mainly for the benefit of
enemy aliens.30 Whether and how far this policy may result in con-
fiscation of private property it will of necessity be difficult to judge until
after the treaty of peace has been adopted and supplemented by munic-
ipal legislation.
ESTOPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION AND THE RECORDING ACTS
The doctrine of estoppel by misrepresentation in its* general outlines
is simple enough; its application to concrete cases involves many diffi-
culties. Chief among these is the determination of whether given facts
constitute a misrepresentation. This is due not merely to the ambiguity
of language but also to the fact that representations can be made by
conduct. The difficulty in each case is to determine just what repre-
sentations are fairly to be understood from the words and conduct in
question. To what extent, for example, does a person who is the "true
owner" of property represent that the "true ownership" is vested in
one to whom he transfers it, or has it transferred, by instruments of
title which contain no indication that the person in whose favor the
documents of title are drawn is not the true owner? This question
has of course arisen most frequently in English law in connection with
the assertion of equitable claims to property. To a brief discussion of
some phases of this problem the present comment will be devoted.
It is well settled in English law that one may cause land purchased
by him to be conveyed to a trustee by a deed which does not reveal the
trust and which even contains a statement that the grantee has paid the
purchase money, and hand over this deed to the grantee, all without
losing his equitable claim even as against a purchaser, provided the
-Dainler v. Continental Tyre Co., ubi supra, 347.
' British Act of January 27, 1916. United States Act of March 28, 1918.
A comparison of the practice of various belligerents is to be found in (1918)
12 AMER. JOUP. op INT. LAW, 744 ff. by J. W. Garner.
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latter has not obtained the "legal title."1  So also he may transfer his
own property to a single trustee by an instrument which does not dis-
close a trust, and yet enforce his equitable claim against a purchaser
or mortgagee from the trustee, if only such purchaser has not obtained
the "legal title."2  The acts of the equitable claimant in giving the
trustee such "indicia of ownership" are not regarded as carrying a
representation that there is no equitable claim. This conclusion is of
course based upon the proposition that, given the English system of
law-including equity law-and the ideas prevalent among Englishmen
who have to deal with such matters, an "ordinarily reasonable and
prudent man" would not draw such an inference. If, however, in the
case last put, the instrument of transfer contains in addition a recital
that the grantee has paid the full purchase price to the grantor, it has
been held that there is in all fairness a representation that the grantee
is the "true" or absolute owner, at least so far as claims of the grantor
are concerned.3 Given this representation, it follows that as against
any one who-changes his legal position to his detriment in reasonable
reliance upon it, the equitable claimant is estopped from claiming the
property as effectively as he would have been if he had made the repre-
sentation in so marly words.
Ordinarily, therefore, according to English law, to permit a trustee
to hold documents of title which fail to disclose any trust is not to
represent that none exists. In such cases to obtain protection, when
dealing with the trustee, a purchaser or mortgagee must bring himself
within the doctrine of purchaser for value without notice by acquiring
the "legal estate" as well as parting with "value," and so cannot rely
merely upon estoppel by misrepresentation.
How stands the matter if to the English system we add the American
system of recording acts? Is the situation altered? Fully to appre-
ciate the problem raised by these questions we must first of all note
that some of the recording acts are so worded as to protect not only
subsequent transferees, mortgagees and persons similarly situated, but
1 Carritt v. Real and Personal Advance Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 263.
'Shropshire Union Ry. etc. Co. v. Regina (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 496 (shares
of stock). Cf. also Edge-v. Worthington (786) 1 Cox Ch. C. 211; Cave v. Cave
(188o) 15 Ch. D. 639; Ewart, Estoppel by Misrepresentation, 265. If the one
advancing the money also obtains the certificates of stock endorsed with a
power of attorney authorizing their transfer, the American authorities regard
him as a bona fide purchaser for value. Duebar Watch Co. v. Daugherty
(igoo) 62 Oh. St. 589, 57 N. E. 455. See discussion in Cook, Alienability of
Choses in Action (917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 478.
'Rinmer v. Webster [1902] 2 Ch. 163. The doctrine of "reputed ownership,"
first introduced into English bankruptcy law by the Statute of 1623 (21 Jac. I,
c. i9, sec. ii) and incorporated in every successive English bankruptcy law
(46-7 Vic. c. 52, sec. 44), applied only to bankruptcy cases and covered only
"reputed ownership" of chattels. Glenn, The Rights and Remedies of Creditors,
see. 181. The American bankruptcy law does not include any such clause, nor
is it found in state statutes. Ibid. sec. i98.
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also creditors who without taking any conveyance or mortgage advance
their money in reliance upon the "record title."'4 In states having
statutes of that kind the problem discussed in the present comment
does not, therefore, arise.
In a large number of states, however, the recording acts provide in
so many words only for the protection of "purchasers" as distin-
guished from "creditors." 5 In spite of this, the courts in many of
these states have found it possible, within certain limits, to protect cred-
itors who have not obtained a lien upon any specific property by invok-
ing the doctrine of estoppel by misrepresentation. The problem may
be put as follows: If the instruments of title (which, although they
disclose no trust, are not under the English law regarded as carrying
a representation that equitable claims do not exist) are to the knowl-
edge of the equitable claimant placed upon record, and if in addition
the person who thus holds the "record title" is placed in possession of
the property in question, what is an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person entitled to infer? Does one act prudently if he infers that the
one thus in possession and holding the "record title" is the "true
owner"? If so, then if anything of value is advanced in reliance upon
such an inference, the doctrine of estoppel by misrepresentation applies.
Whether such an inference can legitimately be drawn, however, is a
question of fact, and we must accordingly be prepared for differences
of opinion on the part of those who have to answer it. In the recent
case of Bergin v. Blackwood (i919, Minn.) 17o N. W. 507, the equit-
able claimant knew that the "record title" stood in the name of a
person who was carrying on a business which involved the incurring of
indebtedness. He did not know that this person who had the "record
title" was stating to those giving him credit that the property in ques-
tion was in truth his own, nor did he know that the creditors were
relying both upon this statement and upon the record. It was held that
the apparent owner's trustee in bankruptcy could recover for the benefit
of unsecured creditors the property in question from the equitable
claimant, to whom the apparent owner had conveyed it when he was
faced with bankruptcy proceedings.
The exact limits of the doctrine applied in the principal case are
difficult to define-indeed, there is much difference of opinion upon
the part of the courts which recognize the doctrine in some form.
Apparently nearly all are agreed that a mere omission to record an
instrument which would reveal the existence of the claim is not of
itself sufficient to estop the claimant,6 although the appearance to the
"Glenn, op. cit., sec. 213.
' There is much dispute in these jurisdictions as to whether a purchaser at
an execution sale is a "purchaser," and, if so, just when he becomes a purchaser.
Cf. Glenn, op. cit., sec. 22.
6Sawyer v'. Turpin (1875) 91 U. S. 114; Rogers v. Page (I905, C. C. A. 6th)
14o Fed. 596; Glenn, op. cit., sec. 216.
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creditors is in that case the same as when the failure to record is inten-
tional. There is, be it noted, in connection with the whole doctrine of
estoppel by misrepresentation much conflict of view as to whether
purely innocent misrepresentations furnish a basis for estopping the
one making them ;7 and it seems clear that in the class of cases under
consideration most courts require at least something more than an
unintentional, non-negligent representation. There is much talk in the
cases of "fraud" and "want of good faith," but these are vague
phrases with little meaning.
How far, then, do the cases actually go in estopping, as against
unsecured creditors as well as purchasers, the claimant who has not
recorded? Apparently there is a fair degree of unanimity in holding
that if the failure to record is intentional and by agreement with the
holder of the record title, the estoppel exists.8 One of the cases which
protects the creditors most liberally was decided in 1913 by the Connect-
icut Supreme Court of Errors.9 A wife for years permitted her hus-
band to appear as the holder of record of the title to all her property.
Apparently he was not engaged in business and did not incur business
debts. With her knowledge he became a stockholder in a corporation.
Unknown to her he became surety upon an "officer's receipt" in order
to release certain property of the corporation from an attachment at the
hands of a creditor of the latter. Before accepting him as surety the
persons involved examined the record of title and relied in accepting
him upon his apparent ownership of the property in question. Before
it became certain that he would ever be called upon as surety to pay
anything, the husband conveyed the property to the wife. Having
failed after judgment and execution against the corporation to obtain
payment of his claim, the creditor obtained judgment against the
husband as surety and then-apparently -about two years after the
reconveyance to the wife-filed a judgment-lien upon the property and
brought an action to foreclose it. It was held that the wife was
estopped to assert title in herself. 10
7Ewart, Estoppel by Misrepresentation, chaps. VIII and IX.
'Pierce v. Hoover (1895) 142 Ind. 626, 42 N. E. 223; Talcott v. Levy (1892,
Super. Ct) 2o N. Y, Supp. 44o; affirmed (1894) 143 N. Y. 636, 37 N. E. 826.
'Goldberg v. Parker (1913) 87 Conn. 99, 87 Atl. 555. Roraback, J., dissented.
0 In the opinion Wheeler, J., says: "Mr. Parker was financially interested in
the Chemical Company; he represented that he owned this property; the
plaintiff looked up the public records, and ascertained that by them, for years,
he had been the owner, and that he had, for over twenty years, owned property
of record in Bridgeport, assumed mortgages upon purchases, and given mort-
gages upon purchases. The titles were such that the most conservative investor
or institution would have accepted them and loaned upon their faith. These
circumstances were naturally calculated to mislead the plaintiff as they did.
The plaintiff did rely upon these titles of record, released his attachment against
the Chemical Company, and in its stead accepted an officer's receipt with Mr.
Parker as surety. It would be difficult to conceive of a stronger case of
equitable estoppel. Any other holding would do violence to the faith which,
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In discussing what the misrepresentor must have done in order to
be estopped, the Connecticut court said: "The test is whether the act
of the wife was naturally calculated to cause the plaintiff to extend
credit to her husband. It is not, as has sometimes been suggested,
whether the wife had reason to expect credit would be extended to her
husband."" This general language must, of course, be interpreted in
the light of the facts before the court-facts which involved an inten-
tional withholding from the record of any evidence of the wife's inter-
est in order that the husband might "appear as the head of the house."
Apparently the great majority of the courts which recognize the
doctrine hold that consciously permitting the record title to stand for a
considerable period of time is sufficient without other fraudulent inten-
tion, provided, be it noted, that the holder of the record title is also
left in possession or control of the property.' 2 The striking thing
about the whole doctrine is that it protects a class of persons--cred-
itors-not provided for in the recording acts in question. This does not
mean that the result reached is unsound. It does mean that the record-
ing acts have themselves become operative facts which, taken in connec-
tion with the general methods of transacting business which have
grown up under the influence of such acts, enable one to make a repre-
sentation in a way unknown to the English law as we inherited it. The
whole doctrine is thus based upon a recognition of the ideas which the
time out of mind, we have given to our registry laws. With inflexible adherence
we have made every title to land, so far as practicable, appear of record. We
have held the record constructive notice to all the world of land titles. We
have authorized reliance to be placed thereon. We have sustained contracts and
conveyances made upon their faith. We cannot hold that a credit, extended
in reliance upon the land records, must yield to the equitable owner of the title
without doing irreparable injury to the- registry laws and going counter to our
decisions.
"The maintenance of our system of registry of titles is of the greatest public
importance, and he who acts in reliance upon the record has behind him not
only the natural equities of his position, but also the especial equity arising
from the protection afforded every one who trusts the record."
" The learned court then went on to hold that even if the latter test were
to be accepted, the facts of the case before it fell within that test. A very
large number of the cases, naturally enough, involve husband and wife. The
cases of that kind are collected in the monographic note in Ann. Cas. I914C
io66. The doctrine, however, is not confined to husband and wife. Susong v.
Williams (i87o) 48 Tenn. (I Heisk.) 625. Nor is it confined to real property.
Williams v. Kirk (1897) 68 Mo. App. 457.
'McCormick Harvesting Mch. Co. v. Perkins (i9o6) 135 Iowa, 64, io N. W.
I5, and cases cited in Ann. Cas. 1914C io6g. The creditors who assert the
estoppel must of course have relied upon the record; but some courts are
apparently willing to establish a presumption that they did so rely, as in Susong
v. Williams, supra, note ii. If a court were to accept the theory that an
innocent misrepresentation furnishes a basis for estoppel, it ought logically to
hold any failure to record, if continued long enough, equally as effective as an
intentional withholding from the record.
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courts believe do in fact prevail among business men. Whether such
notions really are the prevailing ones is obviously purely a question of
fact. If the facts are as the courts have assumed them to be, there can
be no question of the soundness of the result, both from the point of
view of legal principle and that of sound business policy.
W. W. C.
MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS AND THE INCOME TAX
Decidedly the Massachusetts trust has advantages over the corpora-
tion in this matter of taxation.' Some years back, in Eliot v. Freeman,
2
the Supreme Court construed the language of the Tariff Act of August
5, 19o9, ch. 6,1 which laid an excise tax on "every corporation, joint
stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital
stock represented by shares, and every insurance company, now or here-
after organized under the laws of the United States or of any State."4
Stressing the word laws as opposed to law, the Court held that the tax
was imposed only on organizations deriving powers from statutory
enactment; and that a Massachusetts trust could "hardly be said to be
organized, within the ordinary meaning of that term; it certainly was
not organized under statutory laws as corporations are." It therefore
was not included in the tax. Two years later came the Income Tax
Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, sec. II G (a), 5 with a change of wording
which at least has the appearance of being made to meet the above
decision. The tax was to be levied upon the income of "every corpora-
tion, joint-stock company or association, and every insurance company,
engaged in the United States, no matter how created or organized, not
including partnerships." The effect of the new statute on the Massa-
chusetts trust came before the Supreme Court in Crocker v. Malley
(March 17, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918, No. 649.6 The
'The Massachusetts trust is a creation of the profession in Massachusetts,
designed originally, to supply a means-not available under the corporation law
of that state-of quasi-corporate dealing with real estate holdings; transferable
trustees' receipts taking the place of shares of stock. It has proved so success-
ful as to be carried over into other fields. According to the constitution of
the particular trust, its attributes are in varying degree those of a partnership
(the earlier form) and those of a trust (the later form). Closer description,
discussion and analysis, together with a collection of the printed material on
this form of organization, can be found in S. R. Wrightington, Voluntary
Associations in Massachusetts (1912) 21 YALE LAWv JOURNAL, 311-326; and in
COMMENTS (1918) 27 ibid. 677-683.
S(I911) 220 U. S. 178, 31 Sup. Ct. 360.
'36 Stat. L. Ii, i12.
'The italics throughout are the editor's.
5 38 Stat. L. 114, 166, 172.
'For a fuller statement of the facts see REcENT CASE NoTEs, infra, sub. fit.
TRuSTS.
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question there was whether the trustees had been properly taxed on the
income from their holdings of stock in a corporation, the corporation
having already been taxed on its own income. If they were a "joint-
stock company or association," the additional tax was proper; other-
wise, not. The Circuit Court of Appealse decided that the income
received by the trustees was not income arising or accruing during the
year "to the persons for whom they acted," under sec. II D, because
there was nothing in the terms of the trust to make the trustees pay
their receipts over, as income, until they so chose; it found their powers
and functions to "resemble those ordinarily exercised by the managers
of an organization so constituted as to be itself a recipient of taxable
income independently of the individuals beneficially interested in the
property," much more than they resembled the powers of ordinary
fiduciaries acting merely as such for ordinary beneficiaries. It there-
fore lumped trustees and beneficiaries together as an "association"
taxable under the Act.
The weakness of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals would
appear to lie in the insertion of a comma, throughout the opinion,
between the phrases joint-stock company and or association. And it is
at the fact that no such comma or other breaking of the text can fairly
be implied, as well as at the argument derived from Eliot v. Freeman,
that the Supreme Court aims when it says: "The trust . . . would
not fall under any familiar conception of a joint-stock association,8
whether formed under a statute or not." The conclusion is that the
beneficiaries, admittedly not partners in any sense," are not by them-
selves a joint-stock association; that the trustees by themselves are
not; and that there is no ground for lumping the two to make them
one. "We presume that the taxation of corporations and joint-stock
companies upon dividends of corporations that themselves pay the
income tax was for the purpose of discouraging combinations of the
kind now in disfavor . . . There is nothing of that sort here."
But there is here an invitation to the business men and the profession
in other states to investigate the Massachusetts trust and its possibil-
ities, both in the matter of taxation and in that of corporation-baiting
more generally.10
Crocker v. Malley (ii8, C. C. A. ist) 250 Fed. 817.
'Should the Act be amended to read in some such way as "joint-stock com-
pany, or other association," it will be interesting to find .whether the Massa-
chusetts trust can avoid being held to be such an "association." It has already
been held, by a lower court, to be an "unincorporated company" within the
Bankruptcy Act. In re Associated Trust (1914, D. Mass.) 222 Fed. 1012.
'Under Williams v. Milton (1913) 215 Mass. i, io2 N: E. 355, because the
management of the trust was not in the certificate-holders, but in the trustees.
10 See the discussions cited in note i. To the cases therein cited should be
added In re Associated Trust, supra.
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RECENT HOLDINGS OF GENERAL INTEREST
Kelso & Co. v. Ellis (1918, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 364, may well bring
comfort to those who have been disturbed by the occasional tendency of
some courts to branch out into variant interpretations of the provisions
of uniform commercial acts. The New York Court of Appeals in that
case took a long-hoped-for step toward uniformity in the law of ne-
gotiable instruments. It seems that from now on an antecedent or pre-
existing debt will, in New York as well as elsewhere, constitute value
for the transfer of an instrument, even though the transfer be only by
way of security for that debt. To be sure, the anomalous decisions to
the contrary in the lower courts of the state are not necessarily over-
ruled by the actual holding in the instant case. That case might at a
pinch be construed as involving not security for, but actual payment
of, an antecedent debt. But the change in the court's attitude on the
point is unmistakable.1 The earlier cases are excused as revealing
"the habit of bench and bar to look to cases rather than statutes for
principles of commercial law until attention is sharply directed to the
extent that the movement for uniformity of laws through legislation
has been successful." Surely this is the requiem of the doctrine of
Sutherland v. Mead.2 The probable future action of the court is
indicated in no uncertain terms. "It is perfectly clear that for the
sake of uniformity New York has abrogated the rule which had been
in force since the year 1822 . . . Coddington vi,. Bay3 and section 51
[25, original notation] of the Negotiable Instrument Law are irrecon-
cilable in the mind of any candid student of the decisions in this and
other jurisdictions."4
The power of administrative boards to revoke occupational licenses,
while growing in extent, is subjected by the courts to strict compliance
with due process of law and the technical requirements of the statute
under which the board operates. This is illustrated in a recent Illinois
case, Blunt v. Shepardson (1918, Ill.) 121 N. E. 263. Here a physican
was notified to appear before an administrative board to show cause
why his license should not be revoked. No charges were included in
' The judgment below for the plaintiff was reversed, but only in order to let
the jury pass on the plaintiff's good faith in taking the instrument. Crane, J.,
dissented: "on the ground that the evidence would not sustain a finding that
plaintiff was not a bona fide holder for value." (Italics are the editor's.)
2 (19o3, N. Y.) 8o App. Div. lO3, 8o N. Y. Supp. 5o4, construing the N. I. L.
not to change the old New York rule that the giving of an instrument as
security for an antecedent debt was not such a transfer for value as to make
the taker a holder in due course.
'(I822, N. Y.) 2o Johns. 637.
'Italics are the editor's.
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the notice. When he appeared he was informed verbally that the board
had heard that he had been convicted of violation 6f the Harrison Drug
Act. This he admitted, but stated that a writ of error had been granted
and that he felt assured the verdict would be set aside. Shortly there-
after, without statement of any grounds, he received a notice that his
license to practice had been withdrawn. On a petition for certiorari,
the court held the entire proceeding irregular. The board should
have notified him of the charges, in writing, and given him an oppor-
tunity to be heard on them; and the notification of withdrawal of
license should have stated the specific reasons therefor. In other
respects, technical departure from the statute was found. The court
emphasized the necessity of a formal written record in such an impor-
tant proceeding as the revocation of a license, and particularly the
necessity that the order of revocation should show the facts conferring
jurisdiction on the board. The propensity of boards of education and
other administrative boards arbitrarily to exercise their power to revoke
licenses is very properly becoming the object of close judicial super-
vision and of restriction within the limits of due process. 5
It was pointed out in a previous number of the JOURNAL that the
English cases refused rescission of an executed sale of property where
a misrepresentation is innocently made, but that the recent cases quite
properly settle the law to the contrary in this country.6 To the cases
cited in the earlier discussion we may now add Gihon v. Morris (1918,
N. J. Ch.) 105 Atl. 455, where the court decreed recission of a com-
pleted sale and transfer of realty, because of an innocent misrepresenta-
tion. It is interesting to note that the court relied, inter alia, on
general language in one of the English cases, without noting the dis-
tinction made in that country between contracts to sell and completed
transfers of property.
The case of Davis v. St. Paul Coail Co. (1918, Ill.) 121 N. E. I81
shows that the Illinois courts still cling to the indefensible rule that a
declaration which totally omits to allege an essential fact is so much of
a nullity that an amendment adding the missing fact amounts, so far as
the Statute of Limitations is concerned, to starting a new action. As
the requirements which establish what facts must be alleged in the
declaration, and what by way of confession and avoidance, are to a
considerable extent arbitrary, reason and common sense are opposed to
the Illinois rule. For the purpose of stopping the running of the
Statute of Limitations an action should be regarded as started if
'See COMmENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 391.
a (1918) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 929.
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enough facts are stated to inform the defendant of the general nature
of the claim against him.
7
When in the old days the judges took judicial notice that, in fact,
men did not throw bricks molliter at a trespasser, it was put upon the
ground that what all men know, the court might also know, without
more. It would seem as if the same might hold of things all lawyers
know; but the case of Crume v. Brightwell (1919, Ind. App.) 122
N. E. 230, shows this seeming to be at times illusory. Order promis-
sory notes made and payable in Georgia were before the Indiana
court, without any pleading of the Georgia law. The court found the
law settled that it could not in any case take judicial notice of the
statutory laws of other states; that there was a presumption that the
common law, and so here the customary law merchant, prevailed in
such other states; that by such law promissory notes, and therefore
the notes in suit, were non-negotiable. California is doubtless extreme
in her presumption that all other states have been moved to pass just
such statutes as she herself.8 The principal case is no less extreme on
the other side. Surely it is common knowledge that the movement
for uniform commercial laws has been on foot for years, and with
considerable success; that the pioneer act was the N. I. L.; that even
in 1912, when the notes in suit were made, that uniform act was law
in three-quarters of the American jurisdictions. Might not a court'
take notice of these things? If there is any presumption as to such
an act, under such circumstances, should it not rather be that of
adoption ?9 But a court may be slow to presume progress in the law,
whatever the fact. Good; shall the court therefore be quick to pre-
sume regress? There remains the statute of Anne. It was passed
some seven decades before the American colonies took up separate
existence; shall the colonies-be presumed to have rejected it? It would
seem that a time might come, in the ripe old age of a statute-at least
"For a discussion of the general subject, see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JouRrAL,
1053.
'Peck v. Noee (I9o8) 154 Cal. 351, 97 Pac. 865; Cavallaro, v. Texas & P. Ry.
(1895) 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918. But the holdings have not been wholly con-
sistent. Cf. North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Ryan (19o8) 153 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862.
The only rational regulation of judicial notice of foreign law, under present
conditions, is one like that of Connecticut. There "the public statutes of the
several states and territories in the United States, as printed by authority of
the state or territory enacting the same, shall be legal evidence, and the courts
shall take judicial notice of them." "The reports of the judicial decisions of
other states and countries may be judicially noticed by the courts of this state
as evidence of the common law of such states or countries, and of the judicial
construction of the statute or other laws thereof." Conn. Rev. St. 1918, secs.
5726, 5727. This has been law for three-quarters of a century. Conn. Genl. L.
1849, 438.
Georgia has in fact, however, failed as yet to adopt the N. I. L.
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with one passed by the English Parliament before the Revolution-
when it takes on the character of common law sufficiently to be pre-
sumed existent in another state. Even if not-is "common knowledge"
to be limited wholly to non-legal facts? It is flying in the face of
sense for the court to ignore what every lawyer knows, or for that
matter, every business man: that throughout the United States order
notes-whether by express statute in each state or not-have, with
occasional minor differences of form, been as negotiable as order bills.10
The validity of the court's conclusions as applied to the classes of
statutes concerned in the present case, is therefore questioned. Even
so, little harm would have been done, had not the "customary law
merchant" been misconstrued as well. The theory that under the law
merchant promissory notes were non-negotiable goes back to two hot-
tempered decisions of Lord Holt ;"- it has found currency since, as in
the present case. 22 But it was long ago shown that Lord Holt in his
dislike of Lombard Street mistook his law merchant; that the statute
of Anne was passed not to make new law but to declare anew old law
that was good, and so bar Holt from further misdeclaring it; and that
under the common law of England a promissory note to order stood,
as a negotiable instrument, on the same footing with inland bills of
exchange.1 8
Now and again the courts are confronted with a vivid illustration of
the truth that the best of law-makers cannot provide against all those
countless notable things which, as yet, "the ear of man hath not seen
and the eye of man hath not heard." The problem is at once baffling
and amusing when the case shows, as clear as day, that there is only
one fair and just solution, while at the same time, no sound technic of
reaching that solution seems provided by the law. In Sutherland State
Bank v. Dial (1919, Neb.) 17o N. W. 666, the suit was on a negotiable
note, delivered for value to the plaintiff by the defendant maker. But
the instrument had been made payable not to the plaintiff, but to a third
party, W, to whom the plaintiff had expected to negotiate it. W,
however, could not be induced to take the note, and the plaintiff
perforce kept it. Apparently the maker thought this supplied him with
a way out of paying the money; in any case, he did not pay, and put
"°And so of course in Georgia. Code 1911, secs. 427o, 4273. With notes,
additional words have sometimes been required for negotiability: "without
defalcation," "value received," "payable at the X bank," etc. On the other
hand, notes-and not bills-were in some states negotiable, though payable in
commodities. So Georgia. Code 1911, sec. 427o.
' Clerke v. Martin (1702, K. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 1 Salk. 129; Buller v. Crips
(1704, K B.) 6 Mod. 29.
"Cf. also i Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (6th ed. 1913) secs. 5, i62.
(18o4) i Cranch, App. note A, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History, 72.
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the plaintiff to his action. It is evident that the plaintiff realized the
irregularity of any suit by him on the instrument; still, finding no
other way out, he did bring suit thereon--in equity, to save his face.
But the plaintiff was not named on the nofe. There was no mistake or
inadvertence in naming the third party as payee, to found reformation
in equity; or to let in a suit by the true owner under the decision in
Spreng v. Juni (19o9) 1O9 Minn. 85, 122 N. W. 1015, on which the
court relies.' 4 There was no transfer by the named payee, to bring
see. 49 of the N. I. L. into application. Still-and much as such an
action on the note seems at variance with the whole purpose and func-
tion of negotiable paper-one can hardly criticize the court for allowing
recovery. Something had to be done; the mores decidedly called for
action in some form.
A somewhat similar situation, although one doubtless regulated by
the course of business, is presented where a "remitter" obtains a
bank draft payable to his creditor, but later determines not to use it;
or where a man has his bank certify a check payable to the order of
another, and later makes up his mind to use the credit in some other
way. One might juggle the law of contract to protect the holder of an
instrument in such a case, on some such "interpretation" as that: the
bank's promise was in truth to provide a certain amount of credit, to
be used in the first instance in the way indicated, but if that should
prove undesirable, then to be used in another way at the option of the
promisee, on his surrender of the instrument; in the instant case, for
example, the "taking for value" of the note might be considered to
be "in the intention of the parties" only a loan to the maker, the note
being given merely as a very limited security. 15 Or one might work
with quasi-contract, and require restitution of the money paid over-
or of the credit withdrawn because of the certification--on the failure
of an "implied condition" whose actual occurrence the court would
require in order to render the contract binding in its strict terms,' 6
"There is language in Spreng v. Tuni which seems to sustain the decision in
the instant case; but that language is not borne out by the case cited to sustain
it, and is not necessary to the decision. And the Nebraska court appreciated
that the decision involved only a mistaken naming of the wrong payee.
'It was negotiable only to a single party; and under any principle of the
law of negotiable instruments hitherto, it is hard-to see how it could give any
procedural advantage to the present plaintiff, even as evidence.
1 By rigid interpretation of the contract one might of course reach the con-
clusion that the buyer of the instrument had bought merely the maker's promise
to pay a certain person or to that certain person's order; and had bought that
promise in utter willingness to gamble on the expectation of profiting by the
strict terms of the promise without more. Failure of consideration, as currently
understood, can hardly be advanced to change the situation, as the maker is stil
willing to perform his promise, to the letter.
It may be noted that the "contract" solution offered above, like any doctrine
of conditions constructed by the court, savors strongly of quasi-contract-i. e.,
of paucital duty imposed on man by the law, without his consent.
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a condition that the transaction actually work out as the parties
expected. Whatever the technical justification of allowing recovery,
however, it is believed that the principal case is one of those in which
the court should indeed do justice, but must to do justice create new
law.
"Squatters' Rights" on the public domain are frequently given judicial
recognition. This is as true of mineral lands as of other kinds. To
initiate title under the mineral land laws as against the United States,
an actual discovery of mineral is necessary; but where a prospector
has staked out a claim, has actual pedis possessio, and is diligently
exploring the ground, he has rights as against a forcible, fraudulent,
or clandestine intrusion. This is fully recognized in the case of Union
Oil Co. v. Smith (March 31, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918,
No. 8; but it is held that in the absence of a discovery an oil claim is
open to relocation by others if the first locator is not in actual physical
possession. A recent act of Congress provides that where several con-
tiguous oil claims have been located under the placer mining laws, the.
annual assessment work may all be done on any one of the claims,
provided it tends to develop them all. This is held to have no applica-
tion to contiguous oil locations unless a discovery has actually been
made on each of them.
The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts is not limited by
"those trammels that arose from the restrictive statutes and judicial
prohibitions of England." In the case of contracts this jurisdiction
extends not merely to contracts made upon navigable waters, but also
to contracts that "have reference to maritime service or maritime
transactions." So in North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine
R. & S. Co. (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 221, it was held that a contract for the
repair of an existing ship is within admiralty jurisdiction, even though
such repairs are to be made after hauling the ship out of the water by
a marine railway and upon dry land. Jurisdiction is not restricted to
contracts for repairs in dry dock. However, it does not cover contracts
for the original construction of a ship on dry land. In a previous case
the Supreme Court said: "A ship is born when she is launched, and
lives as long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she
is a mere congeries of wood and iron-an ordinary piece of personal
property-as distinctly a land structure as a house. . . . From the
moment her keel touches the water she is transformed and becomes a
subject of admiralty jurisdiction."
Those who are the most ready to refuse to obey the existing laws,
whether bcause of supposed conscientious scruples or otherwise, are
ever the most prompt to appeal to the protection of those laws when
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their own legal rights are infringed. Those. who make the most bitter
attacks "upon our Country and its Constitution are the quickest to appeal
to their protection. This has been amply illustrated during the course
of the great war, especially with respect to the Conscription Act and
the Espionage Act. In three recent cases, United States v. Schenck
(1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 247, Frohwerk v. United States (1919) 39 Sup. Ct.
249, and Debs v. United States (I919) 39 Sup. Ct. 252, the constitu-
tionality of the Espionage Act was attacked on the ground that the
First Amendment prohibits legislation against free speech. It. was
held that this amendment does not deprive Congress of all power, nor
create absolute immunity, with respect to any possible use of language.
A statute is not unconstitutional because it declares the counselling of
murder to be a crime, nor because it forbids a false alarm of fire in a
theatre. So a conviction for a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by
words of persuasion was sustained. Such a conspiracy is criminal,
irrespective of the means to be used and even though the attempt is in
fact unsuccessful. Utterances in furtherance of such a conspiracy are
not privileged even though they are "expressions of a general and con-
scientious belief." The exact line to be drawn between the power of
Congress to abridge freedom of speech under the war and police
powers of the Constitution and the disability of Congress created by the
First Amendment is not fixed hard and fast by the Constitution itself.
"It is a question of proximity and degree."
Our courts must continually, and not merely in exceptional cases,
make the choice between the new rule and the old. They must con-
tinually determine whether the mores of our society have so changed as
to require the replacement of the old by the new. No doubt a just
and correct determination requires the application of the old rule far
more often than the adoption of a new one. In Rosen v. United
States,"' decided in 1918, the Supreme Court decided in favor of a
new rule of evidence, saying "we conclude that the dead hand of the
common4aw rule of 1789 should no longer be applied."1' In the recent
case of State v. Herbert (Dec. 31, 1918, N. J. Sup. Ct.) 105 Atl. 796,
the court very properly adhered to the old rule, Mr. Justice Kalisch
saying" "Firmly established precedents should not be treated as mere
antiquated judicial wisdom and out of joint with modem time, unless
the reason which called them into being has ceased. It cannot be
properly said that the reason which excludes the husband or wife from
giving testimony in a collateral proceeding, to which he or she is a
party, charging the other with an indictable offense, is not as sound
and forceful to-day as it ever was."
"'38 Sup. Ct. 148, discussed (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 572.
"See COMMENT in (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 668, The Dead Hand of
the Common Law; cf. also (i959) 28 ibid. 592.
